Incident evidence for The Drum Wind Farm

1. Key findings for this site

• The register holds 48 onshore wind incidents in the UK.
• The nearest is EIR-1025, Worker dies after becoming stranded at Afton wind farm, about 6.7 km from the site.
• 5 recorded incidents of any size lie within 50 km of the site (5 at grid-scale sites).
• 82 onshore wind sites within 40 km have had an application refused, withdrawn or taken to appeal, 20 of them in East Ayrshire. Final outcomes: 18 refused, 17 refused on appeal, 23 withdrawn, 3 appeal withdrawn, 17 granted on appeal, 3 granted, 1 abandoned. The nearest is Garleffan Wind Farm (refused on appeal), 4.2 km away. 1 scheme under 1 MW is listed apart.
• 17 grid-scale incidents worldwide happened at sites between 24.8 and 99.2 MW.

Counts are of incidents in the register, which is built from published reporting. They are not rates and not a complete census.

2. Incidents in the UK (48)

Nearest to the site first. Distance is a straight line from the site point to the place the entry is mapped to (a town or a site).

4. Every recorded incident within 50 km

Measured on a map from the planning record for The Drum Wind Farm. Every size of site is included here, so a home battery fire nearby is shown, marked as such. Entries are found by their map point only, never by matching words in the text. 16 UK entries have no map point yet and cannot be measured.

5. Grid-scale incidents at sites of a similar size

Sites between 24.8 and 99.2 MW, worldwide, newest first. Capacity is the site's, where the reporting gives it.

6. Lessons for a grid-scale site

The lessons written into the register's entries: every UK grid-scale incident first, then major grid-scale incidents elsewhere. No home battery lessons. Each is the register's reading of the published reporting, not a finding by an investigator.

1. Large mobile cranes on wind farm site roads need a checked route, including slopes and earth banks. EIR-1624
2. A crane that leaves the carriageway can topple and trap the driver, so travel controls matter as well as lifting controls. EIR-1624
3. After a fatal crane incident, similar movements should wait on the regulator's investigation and any immediate site controls. EIR-1624
4. A 33 kV power cabinet must be isolated and proved dead before any maintenance work starts on it. EIR-0403
5. Lockout-tagout procedures must apply to all subcontractors on high-voltage wind farm equipment. EIR-0403
6. Independent verification of isolation is needed rather than assumption that switching has occurred. EIR-0403
7. Nacelle roof work during maintenance requires verified anchor points rated for external loads. Check rating and condition before each use. EIR-0063
8. Fall protection equipment condition and use must be confirmed for every task. Audit specification, condition and correct application together. EIR-0063
9. A regulatory investigation follows every fatal fall from height. Record and review all prior height safety checks at the site. EIR-0063
10. Secure movable plant parts, including bale arms, before cleaning or maintenance starts. EIR-1291
11. Assess the risks of every task involving plant, including routine cleaning. EIR-1291
12. Put in place and follow a safe system of work that keeps workers clear of parts that can fall. EIR-1291
13. After a turbine fire, treat the cause as unknown until the damaged structure has been dismantled and assessed. EIR-1810
14. Taking down a tall fire-damaged turbine needs specialist contractors and close work with the safety regulator. EIR-1810
15. Operators should plan for a long gap between the fire and safe removal, and keep nearby parties informed while that work continues. EIR-1810
16. Treat a reported overspeed collapse as a prompt to check rotor-speed protection, braking and related controls on similar turbines. EIR-0790
17. Do not assume a headline cause applies to other sites until the operator or manufacturer publishes the site, date and findings. EIR-0790
18. Record whether anyone was injured and whether nearby turbines were taken offline, once that is known. EIR-0790
19. Ensure isolation switching programmes are followed exactly and any changes are clearly communicated and documented. EIR-1663
20. Label all high-voltage cabinets clearly and unambiguously before maintenance begins. EIR-1663
21. Verify isolation of the correct equipment before work proceeds and before power is restored. EIR-1663
22. Remote sites need workable emergency communications and rescue arrangements in severe weather. EIR-1025
23. People on site, including subcontractors, need a plan for shelter, heat and power if they become stranded. EIR-1025
24. Weather-related access and evacuation arrangements should be reviewed with all site users. EIR-1025
25. Work at height on a turbine under construction needs a fall-protection and rescue plan that can be used before emergency services arrive. EIR-1077
26. Calls to a remote wind farm should make clear whether the casualty is still at height, so air, ambulance and specialist teams are tasked correctly. EIR-1077
27. Early notice to the safety regulator, and securing the site, helps an investigation while the circumstances are still fresh. EIR-1077
28. Fall protection on wind turbines must be enforced at all times, not only during active maintenance tasks. EIR-0911
29. Operators must prepare for rapid police and regulator notification after any height incident at an operational site. EIR-0911
30. Repeat fatal falls at sites owned by the same operator require immediate review of access and contractor controls. EIR-0911
31. Joint rescue drills must involve every contractor and subcontractor on site rather than separate drills by each firm. EIR-0032
32. Rescue stretchers must keep a casualty horizontal during descent from height to avoid increased chest pressure. EIR-0032
33. Fall arrest disconnection detection with immediate audible or visual warning should be assessed for use on site. EIR-0032
34. Guard all rotating shafts and couplings on turbines before they are accessed or returned to service, and treat missing guarding as a stop condition. EIR-2488
35. Use a documented isolation and locking procedure for rotating equipment during inspections, with checks that the rotor is fully stopped before anyone enters the hazard zone. EIR-2488
36. Assess whether harnesses, lanyards and clothing can become caught in exposed rotating parts, and restrict access to the nacelle during rotor movements. EIR-2488
37. A nacelle fire at 65 metres cannot be fought from the ground, so plans must rest on early detection and remote isolation. EIR-1157
38. Repeat fire events at the same site warrant a wider review of turbine maintenance and fire detection. EIR-1157
39. After blade detachment on an Senvion MM92 turbine, operators must establish a 50 metre exclusion zone at once because public access areas like forests require immediate isolation. EIR-0874
40. Blade failure events need rapid removal of the component for investigation, as retention supports root cause analysis and fleet checks on similar models. EIR-0874
41. Coordination with environmental bodies is essential where turbines stand in shared forest land, to manage temporary closures during investigation. EIR-0874
42. A blade and arm detachment from the nacelle on an onshore turbine can send sections close to a public path, so operators should review exclusion zones around nearby paths. EIR-0441
43. An engineering fault in a turbine operational for under a year led to collapse, so insurers should check recent installation quality records even on new assets. EIR-0441
44. A wind turbine fire at Coldham Wind Farm shows that operators must prepare for limited initial public detail on turbine fires. EIR-0535
45. ScottishPower Renewables should publish full reports on Vestas turbine fires so insurers can assess nacelle fire risks quickly. EIR-0535
46. Isolation arrangements should be available quickly so crews can assess a turbine fire at height. EIR-1578
47. A safety cordon is needed when flames are high on a turbine and cannot be fought directly. EIR-1578
48. After a turbine fire, damage and any effect on local supply should be checked before the outcome is treated as known. EIR-1578
49. A burning turbine top can detach and fall while still alight, so the exclusion area needs to cover falling debris as well as the tower. EIR-1742
50. Where a turbine fire cannot be fought directly, crews may need to monitor debris and fire spread, and the landowner may need to continue that watch after crews leave. EIR-1742
51. With no cause reported, operators should still identify the failed unit and preserve debris so the failure can be investigated. EIR-1742
52. A Nordex turbine fire at a Scottish wind farm site led the operator to start an investigation, so insurers should require early isolation of the unit and a site wide check of similar turbines. EIR-0767
53. Reports on turbine fires often omit key details such as the exact site and damage, so operators must record the turbine number and observed signs at once. EIR-0767
54. A fire in the centre of an onshore turbine can involve the blades and send a large smoke plume over a nearby city. EIR-1946
55. Older single turbines beside industrial sites still need clear emergency access and current liaison with the local fire service. EIR-1946
56. Early reports may show that a fire occurred without establishing cause or damage; those points should stay open until confirmed. EIR-1946
57. Coordinate immediately with emergency services and site staff to isolate an affected turbine. EIR-1951
58. Restrict access and deploy security after a turbine fire until the site is made safe. EIR-1951
59. Start a cause investigation and further inspections while evidence is still available. EIR-1951
60. A turbine fire can send a long smoke plume over nearby homes, so resident advice should be ready before the cause is known. EIR-2021
61. Fire access to turbines on private land between villages should be planned with the operator in advance. EIR-2021
62. Apparent damage seen in photographs should not be recorded as the failed component until it is confirmed. EIR-2021
63. A nacelle fire on a G80-2.0 turbine led to no firefighting action, so operators must rely on early remote isolation and exclusion zones. EIR-1275
64. Two fire services attended a boundary site, so operators should pre-agree joint response protocols for turbines near county lines. EIR-1275
65. Siemens Gamesa does not service this turbine, so post-fire analysis must still include the manufacturer for root cause. EIR-1275
66. A wind turbine tower that snaps at 18m height leaves debris that must be contained at once. EIR-0794
67. After a collapse at a remote site, the owner and manufacturer must secure the area quickly to protect the public. EIR-0794
68. A joint investigation by the turbine maker and site owner is needed to decide if the fault is isolated or fleet-wide. EIR-0794
69. Cordon off and clear debris zones around a turbine promptly after a blade or tower failure, and keep public footpaths closed until the hazard is removed. EIR-2618
70. Inspect blades and towers for structural damage after a reported failure before returning the asset to service. EIR-2618
71. Give local authorities and the public clear information on safety investigations and repair timelines, so that concerns do not build up while a site remains damaged. EIR-2618
72. Operators must isolate a damaged wind turbine and keep it under watch when it remains a danger. EIR-0803
73. Public and emergency service warnings must state clearly what is known when the article text is not available. EIR-0803
74. A headline alone does not give a full account of cause or outcome for a damaged turbine. EIR-0803
75. Fires at the blade to tower connection can lead to blade detachment and falling debris, so site exclusion zones must account for this hazard. EIR-1104
76. Fires at height on turbines are hard for ground crews to fight directly, so emergency plans must assume total loss of the unit. EIR-1104
77. Burning debris from a turbine can ignite ground vegetation, so vegetation management and containment around the base matter. EIR-1104
78. A turbine fire near a road requires plans that address debris and smoke reaching the road, because the turbine stood close to a major road. EIR-1061
79. Limited press reports leave gaps in site name, model and cause, so operators and insurers should obtain the direct incident record. EIR-1061
80. Operators should confirm lightning protection, earthing and bonding on turbines are inspected and tested on a schedule, particularly for older machines. EIR-2624
81. Fire services and operators should agree a response plan for turbine fires, including exclusion zones and when to let a fire burn out. EIR-2624
82. Operators should publish a confirmed cause once investigated, so that other sites can act on the findings. EIR-2624
83. Lightning protection systems and down-conductor paths on wind turbines should be inspected on a defined schedule after storms. EIR-0895
84. Fire services may allow a nacelle fire at height to burn out safely, so site plans must set out this approach in advance. EIR-0895
85. Burning turbines can shed components, so exclusion zones must be set promptly even when public risk is low. EIR-0895
86. Turbine fires can destroy the nacelle and hub quickly, so operators should maintain fire detection and suppression systems in nacelles and test them regularly. EIR-2623
87. Operators should agree emergency response arrangements with local fire services in advance, including access to turbines at height, since fire services may not be immediately available to respond or to give information. EIR-2623
88. Where an incident occurs, operators should publish timely, factual updates and commit to a full investigation with the contractor, so that stakeholders understand the status while the cause is still unknown. EIR-2623
89. An uncommissioned wind turbine tower can still collapse in high winds, so operators must keep remote monitoring and weather response plans active before grid connection. EIR-1134
90. Tower creasing at the access door shows that door cut-outs need extra reinforcement checks during fabrication and quality assurance. EIR-1134
91. A turbine fire at Knabs Ridge scattered debris into fields, so operators must plan for ground-level clean-up after any nacelle or tower fire. EIR-0863
92. On-site staff at Knabs Ridge detected the fire and alerted the fire service, limiting damage to one turbine and keeping the rest of the array online. EIR-0863
93. A wind turbine collapse in high winds requires operators to review structural design for sites exposed to severe winter weather. EIR-1038
94. After a turbine collapse with no published cause, operators should confirm investigation findings before returning similar units to service. EIR-1038
95. A blade control fault on a Nordex N80 turbine can cause collapse after four years of normal operation, so operators should add extra protection even on turbines with clean service records. EIR-0869
96. Debris from a collapsed 100 metre turbine can travel 264 metres, so operators must set exclusion zones and confirm they cover the full fall radius. EIR-0869
97. Emergency services reached the site within minutes with no one present, showing that rapid notification procedures limit the consequences of a turbine collapse. EIR-0869
98. A Vestas nacelle fire during high winds needs early remote detection and isolation, because staff are evacuated above 55mph and cannot reach the site. EIR-0922
99. Network operators must be ready to disconnect a wind farm quickly when a turbine catches fire, to limit damage to the grid. EIR-0922
100. Turbines left unmanned in storms still face nacelle fire risk, so owners need robust remote monitoring and shutdown systems. EIR-0922
101. Check blade and hub components when bolts at the rotor hub fail, as fatigue there can stress fasteners. EIR-0923
102. Inspect highly loaded rotating parts on a schedule, since fatigue can lead to sudden detachment. EIR-0923
103. A substation fire at a wind farm can produce visible smoke plumes over coastal areas, so operators should prepare public alerts for nearby communities. EIR-0173
104. Electrical fires in wind turbine substations need quick attendance by fire services with enough staff, so operators should confirm response plans cover remote sites. EIR-0173
105. A small wind turbine fire can still need multiple fire crews from several stations, so operators should plan for extended response times even when the blaze is limited. EIR-0363
106. Wind turbine fires at height require close work with the operator to extinguish and secure the site, so joint procedures should be in place before an event. EIR-0363
107. A suspected lightning strike on a Nordex turbine can throw parts, so operators must inspect from height after any storm. EIR-0732
108. No injuries or environmental impact from thrown parts means early public notice reduces risk to nearby areas. EIR-0732
109. Rural wind turbine fires require rapid brigade attendance with hose reels, so operators should check that local fire services have mapped access and water points for turbine sites. EIR-0407
110. Fires in wind turbines can be brought under control in about 30 minutes when crews reach the base, so operators should confirm ground level isolation points and safe stand-off distances. EIR-0407
111. Smoke from the top of a turbine requires fire service attendance even in rural areas, as crews must reach elevated components. EIR-0422
112. Fire crews need clear access to respond to nacelle-level fires that cannot be fought from the ground. EIR-0422
113. Confirm blade damage promptly with the operator and record which turbine and blade are affected. EIR-0754
114. Do not infer cause, severity or downtime until those facts are reported. EIR-0754
115. Check landing gate guarding and external control positions on all service lifts to prevent reach into moving parts. EIR-0021
116. Reposition one-touch external controls away from moving lift parts or add interlocks. EIR-0021
117. Assess each service lift individually where no dedicated design standard applies. EIR-0021
118. Inspect, test and maintain temporary generators and their cable connections on construction sites with the same rigour applied to permanent plant. EIR-2512
119. Keep fire-fighting arrangements and emergency access in place for temporary power equipment located near turbines during construction. EIR-2512
120. After an incident, review procedures and communicate the specific measures taken to reduce the risk of recurrence. EIR-2512
121. After a named storm, check blades and the ground around towers for detached fragments. EIR-1760
122. Distinguish newly failed parts from older blades already stored near a tower, so the failed element is correctly identified. EIR-1760
123. Where a site has changed hands, keep a clear record of who is responsible for inspection and repair. EIR-1760
124. A wind turbine fire at height may need no active firefighting if crews work with site staff to isolate and secure the area. EIR-1386
125. Early contact between fire crews and onsite staff can resolve a turbine fire without water or foam. EIR-1386
126. Smoke and flames visible on turbine blades allow early remote isolation by the operator before fire crews arrive. EIR-1119
127. Fire crews attending a turbine fire must agree site control with the supplier before approach. EIR-1119

8. Kept apart: other battery entries in the UK (0)

Home, farm and business batteries, concerns raised where nothing failed, and events at battery sites that were not battery failures. NFCC's grid-scale guidance does not cover home batteries ("Domestic BESS are outside the scope of this guidance."), so they are listed here and not in the tables above.

None.

10. How this pack was made and checked

1. The register is built from published reporting: news, fire service statements, regulators and court records. Each entry lists its sources on its own page. Entries marked provisional rest on thinner sourcing and are rechecked.
2. Grid-scale or not: an entry is grid-scale unless its reporting describes a home, farm or business battery, or an event that was not a battery failure. The rule is the same for every pack.
3. Distances are measured from the site point (the planning record for The Drum Wind Farm) to each entry's map point, which is a town or a site, never an address.
4. Planning decisions come from the government's Renewable Energy Planning Database (Open Government Licence v3.0), with corrections where a council's own record shows a later decision.
5. Desk review. The EIR editorial desk checks each bought pack within 2 working days (Monday to Friday) of the order:
   1. The site point and planning authority match the planning record, or the details the buyer gave.
   2. Each UK incident is a separate event, not one fire written twice, and sits in the right table: grid-scale sites in the main table, home, farm and business batteries apart.
   3. Each UK grid-scale incident has a note, and every quoted passage matches the NFCC text at the link given.
   4. The three nearest planning decisions match the council's own planning record.
   5. The distances to the nearest incidents look right on a map.
   6. Nothing in the pack comes from a confidential submission or names a private person.
6. If anything needs changing, the desk makes a new version and emails the link. Every version is fixed and dated, and earlier versions stay available at the same link. The method is at energyincidentregister.com/pack-method.
7. Information only. It is not engineering, fire safety or legal advice. See the disclaimer.

How to cite: Energy Incident Register, planning evidence pack EIR-PACK-D-THE-DRUM-WIND-FARM-GB-13393, data as of 29 October 2026, energyincidentregister.com.

A correction to any entry is free for anyone: corrections. Questions about this pack: editor@energyincidentregister.com.