Theft, arson and site security
138 lessons from 111 energy incidents, newest first, grouped by technology. Each is taken from the entry it links to, which has what happened and the sources.
Battery storage 1
Grid scale lithium ion battery fires can produce weeks of flare ups, so operators must plan for extended site security and monitoring after the initial event.
Solar PV 10
Sites under construction are exposed to copper theft, so perimeter security and intrusion detection should be in place before energized equipment and cable runs are installed.
Stolen cabling can leave equipment unsafe or unable to operate, so operators should inspect and test cabin connections after any intrusion before re-energising the site.
Maintain rapid coordination with local security forces for incident response.
Perimeter fencing at solar sites must be checked often for cuts, as three holes showed recurring theft that led to live wire exposure.
On multi-occupancy sites, the article credits neighbours and security staff using extinguishers with keeping the fire small before the fire service arrived, so accessible extinguishers and staff trained to use them can limit early spread.
Sites in regions with documented hostility to renewables need perimeter barriers and remote monitoring beyond standard fencing.
Dried vegetation next to perimeter fencing can fuel rapid fire spread in high winds, so operators should clear grass and shrubs before dry seasons.
Store modules and balance-of-system equipment at development sites in fenced, lit and monitored areas, with CCTV covering the stacks.
Solar plants should treat deliberate damage as a security risk and keep access control and detection under review.
Inspect embankments, drainage and fencing after heavy rain and at the start of each rainy season, not only at commissioning.
Wind (onshore) 8
Remote wind sites in areas with civil unrest need perimeter security, intrusion detection and regular patrols or monitoring.
Sites should keep electrical safety managers, inspection records, boundary fencing and warning signs in good order, since these are checked first in a regulatory inspection.
Unauthorised entry into a wind turbine with energised equipment proved fatal, so operators should strengthen physical security at remote unmanned sites.
Three men broke into the turbine, so door locks and intrusion detection are needed to deter and record trespass at isolated assets.
After a blade failure on a turbine over 160 metres tall, site staff need plans for immediate area security and public safety checks.
Post-incident site security and power isolation support safe investigation.
Restrict access and deploy security after a turbine fire until the site is made safe.
Video of a burning wind turbine can spread quickly, so owners should plan for public statements and site security after any visible fire.
Grid infrastructure 116
Secure unmanned substation and cabin enclosures against unauthorised access, using locked doors, intrusion alarms and monitored CCTV.
Include deliberate ignition and vandalism in fire risk assessments for remote or unattended grid assets.
Secure cooling oil and substations against theft, and keep repair capacity supplied with its own oil stock.
Preserve the failed equipment and secure witness accounts and any CCTV footage early, so that the root cause can be established.
Perimeter security and intrusion detection at substations and switchyards need review, because CCTV recorded the attack but did not prevent it.
Operators should agree in advance how incidents are reported to police and how CCTV footage is preserved and shared with investigators, and should assess the grid-wide outage consequences of a successful attack when setting security priorities.
Keep combustible waste and old materials clear of substation boundary walls and fences.
Protect cable routes and substation sites against theft through patrols, fencing and monitoring, and report thefts promptly to police and the network operator.
Operators of high-voltage substations should review perimeter security, fencing and surveillance against deliberate interference from outside the site.
Substations and cable routes can be targeted for metal theft, so operators should review perimeter security, intrusion detection and cable protection at unmanned sites.
Treat fenced electrical installations as live until isolation is confirmed, and do not approach an energised compound before it has been made safe.
Fire and intruder alarm systems should have battery backup, and network operators should coordinate restoration with emergency services and disaster relief.
Where sabotage or tampering is suspected, operators should include physical security of substation sites in their incident response and investigation.
Substations in or near conflict areas face physical attack risk, so operators should assess perimeter security, fire detection and remote monitoring against that threat.
Secure substations and cable routes against theft and vandalism, and monitor sites that have already been attacked.
Physical security of substation cabling and equipment matters as much as electrical design, because theft and vandalism are suspected in some repeated substation outages.
Protect substation sites and cabling against theft and vandalism through physical security, perimeter monitoring and rapid replacement of stolen cable.
Critical substations that have suffered repeated damage need physical security and surveillance reviewed, particularly for underground cable tunnels and chambers.
Live cable and conductor areas should carry clear warning signage and be secured against unauthorised access, since cable theft can expose people to lethal shock.
Operators should work with police and local communities to report and deter cable theft, and should brief emergency responders on the hazards at energised sites.
Substations and mini substations in high-crime areas need physical security such as robust perimeter fencing, intrusion detection and rapid response arrangements.
Where theft is violent, utility security needs a pre-agreed police response rather than being left to manage the scene alone.
Secure substations against metal theft to prevent damage and outages.
Where security conditions force contractors to leave a power station, operators need a plan for the capacity that then stays unavailable.
Treat an unexplained substation fire as both a safety event and a security event until investigators rule out third-party action.
Missing security doors at substations allow unauthorised access next to live cables, so operators must check and replace all enclosure doors after each complaint.
Underground cable tunnels at urban substations need stronger access controls because suspected theft and vandalism can start fires.
A second fire at the same substation within two weeks requires immediate root-cause review and extra security, not only repairs.
A substation next to an external fire can suffer extensive damage when combustible material is placed against it, so operators should enforce clearance zones around all perimeter fencing.
A substation that remains accessible to the public allows vandals to place burning items close to live equipment, so operators should review and upgrade fencing and surveillance at similar sites.
Lightning with strong winds and heavy rain can trigger transformer fire and explosion, so operators should verify surge protection and structural security on exposed units.
When arson is considered a possible cause of a substation fire, operators should check physical security measures.
A damaged transformer can detonate and produce flames, so operators should verify remote isolation and establish a security perimeter before staff approach.
A substation fire can spread via dielectric oil, so operators should check oil levels and seals at sites already flagged for theft.
Forced removal of on-duty personnel at a substation prevents safe restoration, so sites need security plans that protect control staff during unrest.
Perimeter checks at grid sites can deter unauthorised access, so fence integrity must be verified regularly.
Transformer substations need monitored perimeter fencing, as a cut fence was found at a similar site in Wesel.
Substation control and protection cabling should be physically secured, because cable theft can extend restoration times after an incident.
A perimeter fence does not stop fire, so operators should assess the heat exposure of transformers and other equipment close to the boundary.
Fire in a neighbouring outbuilding or fence line can spread to an electrical substation, so keep the area around substation perimeters clear and check that adjacent structures are not a fire route.
Reinforce perimeter security and intrusion detection at substations.
Review copper theft prevention measures across grid sites.
Third-party damage at a substation kiosk can cause fire and outage, so operators should check perimeter security and external impact monitoring.
Copper cable theft at substations can start fires that cut supply to large areas, so operators should fit secure cable enclosures and intrusion detection.
Unauthorised entry into a live substation can cause severe burns, so operators should check perimeter fencing and barbed wire for gaps at legacy sites.
Possible metal theft at substations requires intrusion alarms or monitoring, especially at older facilities.
Cable theft at a substation can damage cabling and switchgear and start a fire, so operators should add physical barriers and monitoring around exposed cables.
Damage to transformers and switchgear from theft can leave parts of the site out of service for days, so plans must cover staged testing and safe restoration.
Protect substation earth conductors and cable routes against theft through physical security, regular patrols and asset marking.
Ring-fence maintenance budgets for critical grid infrastructure, since cuts can leave crews repairing equipment without parts or tools.
Physical security at substations, including perimeter controls and intrusion detection, should be tested regularly, because a breach can precede a deliberate attack.
Damage to ancillary structures such as fencing and sheds shows the reach of a substation failure, so site layout and clearance from neighbouring property should be reviewed.
Substations need physical perimeter security and intrusion detection, because cable theft at energised sites can cause short circuits, fire and outages.
A transformer fire at an industrial site can cut power and lead nearby facilities to flare, so operators should plan for effects beyond the site fence.
Suspected cable theft should stay marked as unconfirmed until investigators finish their work, and the scene should be preserved.
Physical security measures at substations should be reviewed to deter cable theft attempts.
Rapid damage assessment and material sourcing procedures can reduce restoration times after vandalism incidents.
Theft and vandalism can leave part of a network offline after the main supply returns, so cable and distributor security needs its own checks.
Substation sites should have intrusion detection and rapid response protocols to deter arson attempts.
Substations require robust physical security and monitoring of control cabling to deter vandalism and theft.
The newest 60 of 116 shown. The rest are on each grid infrastructure entry.
Data centre 2
Emergency contact points and docking points with building staff and security should be agreed and tested before an incident.
Building security staff should confirm whether people are present near critical equipment before reporting a building empty, since an incorrect report of an empty building can delay evacuation checks.
Other 1
Keep sufficient replacement generation available elsewhere in the system, so that the loss of one station does not threaten supply security, and have a plan to restore affected customers.