Register / Data centre / EIR-1857
← Back to the list
Data centreIranEIR-1857

Fire at Telecom Infrastructure Company data centre in Tehran

Mar 2022Published 2 Oct 2026Updated 13 Oct 2026Responsible editor: Chief Editor

Estimated damageEstimated by the register's adjusterHow? Know the real figure?
Figure hidden: shown to subscribersLow confidence
out of service for about •• daysShown in the record →Full estimate
From the recordRoot cause hiddenFailed part hidden

Companies named in the reporting of this entry (being named is not a finding of fault): Telecom Infrastructure

On 4 March 2022 a fire broke out at a building of the Telecom Infrastructure Company (TIC) in Tehran, Iran. The data centre was identified by Iran's Ministry of Communications and Information Technology as LCT. According to a post from the centre cited by The Register, a disruption in the centre's electrification system led to fire in UPS and electrification systems. Images shared online and in Iranian media showed fire engines attending telecommunications buildings in Tehran.

Internet connectivity fell across multiple providers in Tehran, the nearby city of Karaj and other cities, and NetBlocks recorded a loss of connectivity from the morning of 4 March. Service was largely restored about three hours after the onset of the outage. The ministry said the problem was resolved after about an hour, but service remained largely unavailable for longer. The TIC serves as the gateway for network operators in the country.

Sources point to a fault in the electrification system or a malfunction in a power connection, which led to a fire in UPS and electrification equipment. The Register reports that a lack of redundancy in internet traffic gateways exacerbated the effects of the outage. The cause has not been independently confirmed.

  1. Data centre UPS and power distribution equipment needs thermal monitoring, fire detection and tested procedures to isolate electrical faults before a fire develops.
  2. Single gateways that carry traffic for many operators create a single point of failure, so operators should maintain redundant routes and diverse paths.
  3. Initial public statements about cause and duration may differ from later accounts, so operators should publish a verified timeline and root cause after an incident.

More lessons on worker safety and safe systems of work, emergency response and public communication, from every incident on the register.

Published 2026-10-02. Written from public reporting. Descriptive, not investigative. See the data accuracy disclaimer.

See the register's stories first in Google: add it as a preferred source.

Chart to reuse with this story: Data centre incidents by year, free with a credit (PNG).

See UPS and battery room fires at data centres.

Browse the full register or submit an incident.