Strikes on Amazon Web Services UAE data centre cause fire and power loss
Mar 2026Published 2 Oct 2026Updated 13 Oct 2026Responsible editor: Chief Editor
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Companies named in the reporting of this entry (being named is not a finding of fault): Amazon Web Services
What happened
On 1 March 2026, at around 4:30am Pacific time (4:30pm UAE time), one Availability Zone, mec1-az2, in Amazon Web Services' ME-CENTRAL-1 region in the UAE was impacted by objects that struck the data centre, creating sparks and fire. AWS initially reported that the fire department shut off power to the facility and its generators while fighting the fire. Power and connectivity to the zone were lost, affecting EC2 instances, EBS volumes and other services.
AWS said restoration would take several hours and that it was still awaiting permission to turn the power back on. Later updates said a second zone, mec1-az3, was also significantly impaired, while mec1-az1 continued to operate. On 2 March, AWS attributed physical damage at two UAE facilities to drone strikes, saying the strikes caused structural damage, disrupted power delivery and in some cases required fire suppression that caused water damage. AWS had not publicly confirmed the specific objects or weapons involved.
Contributing factors
Strikes on the facility, a fire, loss of power delivery to the zone, and water damage from fire suppression. The fire department cut power to the facility and generators, and AWS was awaiting permission to restore power. The specific object or weapon that struck the site and the origin of the fire were not confirmed in the sources.
Lessons learned
- Operators should design power and network resilience so that a loss of one availability zone does not take down customer services, and customers should spread workloads across zones and regions.
- Agree restoration protocols in advance with fire and emergency services, since emergency isolation of power and generators can prolong recovery.
- Assess physical threats to facilities in conflict zones, including structural damage, power delivery loss and water damage from suppression, and plan for multi-region failover.
More lessons on spacing, layout and fire spread, electrical protection and isolation, structural integrity and turbines, from every incident on the register.
Source
Published 2026-10-02. Written from public reporting. Descriptive, not investigative. See the data accuracy disclaimer.