Power outage at privately owned data centre disrupts Defra border service
May 2024Published 4 Oct 2026Updated 13 Oct 2026Responsible editor: Chief Editor
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What happened
A power outage at a privately owned data centre used by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) affected several Defra digital services from 11 to 14 May 2024. One affected service was the Automatic Licence Verification System (ALVS), which cross-references data from traders of animal and plant goods submitted to HM Revenue and Customs and Defra, and which can automatically clear matched goods for release. According to a written parliamentary answer from Defra, the service was unavailable from 07:46 on 11 May to 20:50 on 14 May 2024, a total of 85 hours and 4 minutes.
Defra said business continuity plans were activated as soon as the disruption was identified, and that it had contingency arrangements for clearing affected vehicles and consignments at the border with HMRC and Border Force. Defra stated there had been no significant delays to border checks.
Contributing factors
The sources state only that the outage was caused by a power outage at the privately owned data centre. The power equipment that failed, the cause of the power loss and the length of time before power was restored are not reported. The site location and the data centre operator are not named in the sources.
Lessons learned
- Operators of data centres supporting critical public services should confirm how power loss is handled, including UPS runtime, generator start and transfer, and restoration sequencing, and test these regularly.
- Customers of third-party data centres should know the power resilience of the facility they depend on and whether their services have failover to another site.
- Services that clear goods or information at a border or other critical checkpoint should have documented business continuity and manual fallback procedures that can be activated quickly and kept under review.
More lessons on outages, backup supply and restoration, worker safety and safe systems of work, from every incident on the register.
Source
Published 2026-10-04. Written from public reporting. Descriptive, not investigative. See the data accuracy disclaimer.