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Data centreUnited StatesEIR-1843

Power failure at Bend data centre postpones hospital elective surgery

Feb 2019Published 2 Oct 2026Updated 13 Oct 2026Responsible editor: Chief Editor

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Companies named in the reporting of this entry (being named is not a finding of fault): OneNeck IT Solutions

On 7 February 2019 a power failure at The Vault, a data centre in Bend, Oregon, operated by OneNeck IT Solutions, took down services for its customers. The operator said that both the main and the backup power systems had failed. Services were restored for most customers within 45 minutes to one hour, and the local internet provider BendBroadband was back within 20 minutes. St. Charles Health System, a customer, reported a network outage at 7:30am, moved to its downtime procedures and postponed elective surgeries.

Its systems returned around 2pm, and the postponed surgeries were resumed. The facility is described as Tier III certified. The operator said an investigation into why the redundant power system also failed was under way, and the sources reviewed do not give a cause.

The sources do not state why the redundant power system failed. The investigation was ongoing at the time of reporting. The hospital system was not back to normal operations until about 2pm, although BendBroadband reported most of its services restored within an hour. The sources do not explain why the hospital was affected for so long.

  1. Test automatic transfer and backup power paths under realistic load, and confirm that backup power is independent of the primary supply rather than sharing a common failure point.
  2. Customers of colocation facilities that support critical services, such as hospitals, should keep tested downtime procedures and alternative communication routes that do not depend on the same provider.
  3. Map the dependencies of critical services on shared infrastructure so that a single power failure mode cannot disable both primary and secondary systems unnoticed.

More lessons on outages, backup supply and restoration, worker safety and safe systems of work, from every incident on the register.

Published 2026-10-02. Written from public reporting. Descriptive, not investigative. See the data accuracy disclaimer.

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