Power spike disables primary data centre of First National Bank
2012Published 12 Oct 2026Responsible editor: Chief Editor
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Companies named in this entry: City Power
What happened
A power surge from the public electricity network disabled the primary data centre of First National Bank (FNB) in South Africa, in early 2012 (the exact date is not stated in the source). The bank estimated the surge at around 12,000 kVA and said it was greater than anything its systems could withstand. Two substations serving the area were affected, and the bank, being close to both, bore the greatest impact.
The primary data centre was disabled. A reduced-capacity standby system handled critical transactions such as card swipes and in-branch deposits at about 200 transactions per second, against a normal 800 to 1,000. Some business and online transaction problems followed and were resolved quickly. At 10am following the incident the bank formally declared a disaster and moved fully to its alternate data centre, which it expected to run as primary for the near term. Customers across the country and abroad experienced disruption.
Contributing factors
A utility-side power surge of an estimated 12,000 kVA, which the bank said was greater than its systems could withstand. Both substations supplying the area were affected, and the site's proximity to them increased the impact. City Power had not given an explanation at the time of reporting.
Lessons learned
- Power protection and surge withstand ratings for data centre electrical systems should be checked against worst-case utility disturbances, not only routine outages.
- Operators close to a shared substation should assess their exposure to faults affecting several feeders at once.
- A tested disaster recovery process with a standby system for critical transactions allowed continued service during the event, but reduced capacity still causes customer harm and should be planned for.
- After a major electrical event, damage assessment should be completed before the alternate site is treated as the long-term primary.
More lessons on electrical protection and isolation, from every incident on the register.
Source
Published 2026-10-12. Written from public reporting. Descriptive, not investigative. See the data accuracy disclaimer.
