Lithium battery fire at South Korean state data centre disrupts government services
Sept 2025Published 2 Oct 2026Updated 13 Oct 2026Responsible editor: Chief Editor
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Companies named in the reporting of this entry (being named is not a finding of fault): LG CNS, LG Energy Solution, National Information Resources Service
Also named in the reporting: National Information Resources Service
What happened
A fire broke out on the evening of 26 September 2025 in a server room on the fifth floor of the National Information Resources Service (NIRS) data centre in Daejeon, South Korea. Officials suspect the fire began when a lithium-ion battery exploded during maintenance work to move backup power battery modules to the basement. Asahi reports that the batteries were sold and maintained by LG CNS, and Reuters reports that they were produced by LG Energy Solution.
The fire went into thermal runaway, and firefighters deployed 101 personnel and 31 vehicles, needing more than nine hours to bring it under control. A man in his 40s suffered first-degree burns to the face and arm. Eight of the sixteen battery storage cabinets were partly destroyed. The government shut down 647 online systems as a precaution, and 96 systems were directly damaged. By 7 October 2025, 163 systems had been restored, a restoration rate of 25.2 percent.
Contributing factors
A national audit by the Board of Audit and Inspection, as reported by fnnews, found that battery relocation work was subcontracted illegally to firms not registered for electrical construction. The audit estimates that battery racks were not fully de-energised during dismantling and that cable terminations were not properly insulated, and it presumes that a spark between racks four and five started the fire. The audit found that no written work plan was prepared or checked, that the contractor reported manufacturer support was difficult to obtain, and that NIRS oversight was weak. The battery modules had been in use for more than a decade, their warranty had expired, and the maintenance contractor had advised replacement in June 2024. Recovery was also delayed because no priority restoration plan with target times had been set.
Lessons learned
- Replace backup batteries when they reach the manufacturer's service life, and act on written replacement advice from maintenance contractors.
- Verify that every contractor and subcontractor holds the required electrical registration, and prohibit unauthorised subcontracting.
- Fully de-energise battery racks before dismantling or moving them, and insulate all cable terminations before work resumes.
- Require a written method statement, confirmed manufacturer support, and independent supervision for any high-risk battery work.
- Maintain a restoration plan that ranks critical systems and sets recovery time targets, so that recovery is not delayed by the order of repairs.
More lessons on worker safety and safe systems of work, electrical protection and isolation, emergency response and public communication, from every incident on the register.
Published 2026-10-02. Written from public reporting. Descriptive, not investigative. See the data accuracy disclaimer.