Two fatalities in an onshore turbine nacelle fire during maintenance

In October 2013 a fire broke out in the nacelle of an onshore wind turbine in the Netherlands while a maintenance team was working inside it. Two maintenance workers died. The event is described in academic and legal commentary as the first recorded fatal wind turbine fire. Reporting states that the investigation attributed the fire to an electrical failure inside the nacelle, although the specific component involved was not made public. The workers were at height in a confined space and the fire developed rapidly, and rescue was not possible. The case has since been cited widely in reviews of wind turbine fire risk assessment and fire protection. Sector attention on nacelle fire detection, suppression and emergency egress increased after the event, although provisions across the operating fleet remain varied.

Sources state that the fire was caused by an electrical failure inside the nacelle. Wider fire risk literature cited alongside the case notes that electrical faults are the most common ignition source in wind turbines, arising from failures in control systems, wiring, transformers or switchgear that produce arcing or overheating, and that flammable lubricants and insulation materials are present throughout the nacelle. Commentary on the case also identifies the presence of personnel in the nacelle at the moment of ignition, and the limited fire detection, fire suppression and emergency egress provisions typical of turbines of that generation. The register has not been able to confirm from primary sources what detection, suppression, egress equipment or emergency training were in place at this turbine.

1. Treat the nacelle as the highest consequence work location on a turbine for fire risk and reflect this explicitly in work planning, permit conditions and emergency preparedness.
2. Recognise that descent by the tower ladder alone may not be achievable once a nacelle fire is developing, and assess egress time against realistic fire and smoke development for each turbine type.
3. Specify controlled descent equipment, such as ropes and descenders or platform based evacuation, for every turbine where personnel enter the nacelle, and train and re-assess personnel in its use.
4. Fit automatic fire detection in the nacelle, using heat, flame or smoke detection as appropriate, so that personnel receive early warning while descent is still viable.
5. Assess the case for automatic suppression in the nacelle, for example water mist, foam or dry chemical, on a per fleet basis to buy egress time and limit asset loss.
6. Include a fire emergency response sequence in maintenance procedures, covering the trigger for abandoning work, the descent route, communication with the ground and the rescue protocol, and rehearse it.
7. For turbines commissioned before nacelle fire protection became common practice, carry out and record a formal review of whether retrofit detection, suppression and egress upgrades are warranted.

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