Two fatalities in an onshore turbine nacelle fire during maintenance
2013Published 1 May 2026Responsible editor: Chief Editor
- Where
- Onshore wind turbine in the Netherlands, October 2013
- What
- Fire broke out in the nacelle during maintenance
- Injuries
- Two maintenance workers died
- Cause
- Electrical failure inside the nacelle
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What happened
In October 2013 a fire broke out in the nacelle of an onshore wind turbine in the Netherlands while a maintenance team was working inside it. Two maintenance workers died. The event is described in academic and legal commentary as the first recorded fatal wind turbine fire. Reporting states that the investigation attributed the fire to an electrical failure inside the nacelle, although the specific component involved was not made public.
The workers were at height in a confined space and the fire developed rapidly, and rescue was not possible. The case has since been cited widely in reviews of wind turbine fire risk assessment and fire protection. Sector attention on nacelle fire detection, suppression and emergency egress increased after the event, although provisions across the operating fleet remain varied.
Contributing factors
Sources state that the fire was caused by an electrical failure inside the nacelle. Wider fire risk literature cited alongside the case notes that electrical faults are the most common ignition source in wind turbines, arising from failures in control systems, wiring, transformers or switchgear that produce arcing or overheating, and that flammable lubricants and insulation materials are present throughout the nacelle. Commentary on the case also identifies the presence of personnel in the nacelle at the moment of ignition, and the limited fire detection, fire suppression and emergency egress provisions typical of turbines of that generation. The register has not been able to confirm from primary sources what detection, suppression, egress equipment or emergency training were in place at this turbine.
Lessons learned
- Nacelle fires at height in confined spaces develop rapidly, so operators must plan maintenance with early detection and viable egress routes.
- Limited detection, suppression and egress provisions on older turbines increase fatality risk during nacelle work.
- Electrical faults in control systems, wiring or switchgear ignite fires where flammable materials are present.
More lessons on structural integrity and turbines, electrical protection and isolation, from every incident on the register.
Not yet known
- Specific component that failed
- Fire detection, suppression and egress equipment present
- Turbine model and age
- Cost of the incident
This entry is updated when these are reported. Get an alert for the next one like it.
Source
Published 2026-05-01. Written from public reporting. Descriptive, not investigative. See the data accuracy disclaimer.