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Grid infrastructureUnited StatesEIR-1911

Line fault shifts 3.8 GW of Virginia data centre load to backup power

July 2026Published 3 Oct 2026Updated 13 Oct 2026Responsible editor: Chief Editor

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Companies named in the reporting of this entry (being named is not a finding of fault): Dominion Energy

On Wednesday 22 July 2026, at 07:56, a 230 kV transmission line fault occurred within the Dominion zone of the PJM grid. Data Center Knowledge reported that the line fault was in Ashburn, Virginia, and Dominion Energy said the data centres transferred to backup power after the fault. PJM reported that approximately 3,800 MW of load transferred to back-up generation, and that the fault was cleared properly. The load transfer caused high voltage conditions, which triggered the transfer of additional load to back-up generation.

RTO Insider reported that about 3 GW of data centre load switched to backup power, causing flickering lights in the area but no loss of power. PJM recorded area control error reaching +3,928 MW and frequency reaching 60.092 Hz, and a balancing authority area limit excursion recovered within nine minutes. Dominion said no load was shed and that the data centres' own control systems transferred them to backup power for a very short period. Dominion said its system operations team restored normal operating conditions within minutes.

PJM reported no relay misoperations or stuck breakers. The load transfer caused high voltage conditions that triggered further transfers to backup generation. Dominion said the data centres' own protection and control systems initiated the transfer. The cause of the line fault has not been disclosed.

  1. Automatic transfer of large loads to backup generation can create gigawatt-scale load changes that the grid must absorb, so transfer logic and voltage thresholds should be modelled across the whole connected portfolio.
  2. Voltage-sensitive loads can respond simultaneously to the same disturbance, a common-mode response that individual site studies may not reveal.
  3. Reconnection of load transferred to backup power should be coordinated with the grid operator to avoid a second disturbance.
  4. Operators should maintain real-time visibility of how much load has moved behind the meter and how much backup generation is running.

More lessons on outages, backup supply and restoration, from every incident on the register.

Published 2026-10-03. Written from public reporting. Descriptive, not investigative. See the data accuracy disclaimer.

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