Incident evidence for Dogger Bank South West

1. Key findings for this site

• The register holds 12 offshore wind incidents in the UK.
• 9 grid-scale incidents worldwide happened at sites between 750 and 3,000 MW.
• The site could not be placed on a map from the details given, so the distance sections are empty. Write to the editor with a postcode and a new version will be made at no charge.

Counts are of incidents in the register, which is built from published reporting. They are not rates and not a complete census.

2. Incidents in the UK (12)

Newest first.

3. Every recorded incident within 50 km

The site could not be placed on a map, so this section is empty.

4. Grid-scale incidents at sites of a similar size

Sites between 750 and 3,000 MW, worldwide, newest first. Capacity is the site's, where the reporting gives it.

5. Lessons for a grid-scale site

The lessons written into the register's entries: every UK grid-scale incident first, then major grid-scale incidents elsewhere. No home battery lessons. Each is the register's reading of the published reporting, not a finding by an investigator.

1. Motion-compensated gangways should give a clear audible and visual warning before automatic retraction, or be taken out of service until they can. EIR-1662
2. Personnel transfers at height need clear supervision, communication and a workable manual override. EIR-1662
3. Operators should review gangway arrangements after safety notices on these systems. EIR-1662
4. A nacelle fire at an offshore wind turbine can result in total loss of the unit given the difficulty of firefighting access at sea. EIR-0447
5. Decommissioning a fire-damaged offshore turbine can require extensive licensing processes with regulators such as marine management authorities, extending timelines well beyond the incident itself. EIR-0447
6. Serious injury reports should record the site, date, task and equipment so other operators can learn from them. EIR-1781
7. Work on offshore turbines should be controlled so people cannot be injured by moving parts. EIR-1781
8. A reported court finding of duty breaches is a prompt to review how contractor work is planned and supervised, without treating the short report as a full account. EIR-1781
9. Isolation should be verified before work starts on a turbine blade, not assumed from an earlier check. EIR-1778
10. Maintenance procedures should require a further check that power is off before a repair begins. EIR-1778
11. After a serious maintenance injury, equipment and procedures should be reviewed promptly. EIR-1778
12. An offshore turbine fire can lead to removal, so operators should include loss of a single unit in availability and revenue contingency planning. EIR-0431
13. Offshore turbine removal after fire needs heavy lift vessels and marine support, so pre-agreed contracts should be in place. EIR-0431
14. A nacelle fire on an offshore turbine requires plans that cover personnel accounting, exclusion zones and debris recovery at sea. EIR-0431
15. A blade on a turbine left with rotor locked and yaw disabled can fail in high winds, so operators should check weather exposure limits before locking during commissioning. EIR-0029
16. Separate root causes for similar blade failures on one design require operators to review each incident on its own merits rather than assume a single fix. EIR-0029
17. An offshore installation error can damage a blade on an installed turbine, so operators should apply the same quality controls and hold points to marine lifts as to factory work. EIR-0028
18. Early findings that limit the issue to one blade still require checks on other units installed in the same campaign or by the same crew. EIR-0028
19. A marine area restriction after blade damage allows safe resumption only once findings confirm the cause is confined to the affected unit. EIR-0028
20. Collision by a service operation vessel damaged a turbine, so operators should review approach procedures and exclusion zones around offshore turbines. EIR-0758
21. Vessel contact with a turbine caused damage, so operators should require structural inspection of the tower and foundation before return to service. EIR-0758
22. Service vessel collision at an offshore wind farm carries risk of damage, so insurers should check crew training records for close-quarters manoeuvring. EIR-0758
23. Where an offshore turbine fire is detected remotely, operators should have a documented response that includes notifying the coastguard and confirming the status of the incident to the public. EIR-2614
24. Operators should record when a fault is detected, when vessels are dispatched and when the fire is confirmed out, so that public questions can be answered quickly. EIR-2614
25. Where visible smoke is reported by the public, operators and authorities should issue a short factual statement early to prevent speculation about spread or casualties. EIR-2614
26. Major component exchange on offshore turbines needs rigorous lifting equipment checks and procedures, as a dropped hub and blades can fall into the sea. EIR-0900
27. Operators must hold environmental contingency plans for offshore maintenance, ready for debris in the sea or on shorelines. EIR-0900
28. Prompt authority alerts after offshore incidents limit environmental and reputational harm. EIR-0900
29. An installation vessel at night needs tested plans for multiple casualties and helicopter evacuation from a working deck. EIR-0962
30. A multi-casualty event on an installation vessel should trigger an immediate return to port to preserve evidence. EIR-0962
31. Vessel operator, project operator and regulator should agree investigation duties before mobilisation. EIR-0962
32. Issue a notice to mariners promptly when a blade section from an offshore turbine enters the sea and remains unaccounted for. EIR-1752
33. Keep the affected turbine shut down and continue to monitor the site while debris may still be adrift or submerged. EIR-1752
34. Plan component and vessel availability for blade replacement while the cause is still being investigated. EIR-1752
35. Vessel captains must maintain a proper lookout when navigating near offshore wind turbines. EIR-0498
36. Offshore wind farms in fishing areas need clear marking and communication to local fleets. EIR-0498
37. A 107 metre blade with a manufacturing bond defect can shed large fragments into the sea, so operators must plan for marine and shoreline debris recovery. EIR-0027
38. Radiographic inspection of all blades from one factory is needed when a production deviation is found, to catch defects missed by earlier quality checks. EIR-0027
39. A blade fault traced to one factory requires clear traceability records so the affected population can be identified quickly. EIR-0027
40. A blade failure in commissioning can spread debris over a wide marine area, so plans must cover extended sea and beach recovery with pre-agreed contractors. EIR-0005

7. Kept apart: other battery entries in the UK (0)

Home, farm and business batteries, concerns raised where nothing failed, and events at battery sites that were not battery failures. NFCC's grid-scale guidance does not cover home batteries ("Domestic BESS are outside the scope of this guidance."), so they are listed here and not in the tables above.

None.

9. How this pack was made and checked

1. The register is built from published reporting: news, fire service statements, regulators and court records. Each entry lists its sources on its own page. Entries marked provisional rest on thinner sourcing and are rechecked.
2. Grid-scale or not: an entry is grid-scale unless its reporting describes a home, farm or business battery, or an event that was not a battery failure. The rule is the same for every pack.
3. Distances are measured from the site point (not found) to each entry's map point, which is a town or a site, never an address.
4. Planning decisions come from the government's Renewable Energy Planning Database (Open Government Licence v3.0), with corrections where a council's own record shows a later decision.
5. Desk review. The EIR editorial desk checks each bought pack within 2 working days (Monday to Friday) of the order:
   1. The site point and planning authority match the planning record, or the details the buyer gave.
   2. Each UK incident is a separate event, not one fire written twice, and sits in the right table: grid-scale sites in the main table, home, farm and business batteries apart.
   3. Each UK grid-scale incident has a note, and every quoted passage matches the NFCC text at the link given.
   4. The three nearest planning decisions match the council's own planning record.
   5. The distances to the nearest incidents look right on a map.
   6. Nothing in the pack comes from a confidential submission or names a private person.
6. If anything needs changing, the desk makes a new version and emails the link. Every version is fixed and dated, and earlier versions stay available at the same link. The method is at energyincidentregister.com/pack-method.
7. Information only. It is not engineering, fire safety or legal advice. See the disclaimer.

How to cite: Energy Incident Register, planning evidence pack EIR-PACK-D-DOGGER-BANK-SOUTH-WEST-GB-20217, data as of 29 October 2026, energyincidentregister.com.

A correction to any entry is free for anyone: corrections. Questions about this pack: editor@energyincidentregister.com.